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FOREWORD
This end-of-year Summary Report documents and summarizes the
results of all tasks for the entire first year of Contract NASW 2494. It
provides a synopsis of all the published and unpublished analysis per-
formed by SAI during the twelve months from 1 February '73 to 31
January '74.
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END OF YEAR SUMMARY
REPORT NASW 2494
ADVANCED PLANETARY ANALYSES
Science Applications, Inc. (SAI) is engaged in a program of advanced
study and analysis for the Planetary Programs Office (Code SL) of
NASA. The objectives of this study and analysis are to ensure that NASA has
an adequate range of viable future planetary mission options compatible with
NASA's long range objectives for planetary exploration. The nature of the
work is quite varied, ranging from short quick response items to pre- Phase
A mission studies. This is an end-of-year Summary Report which documents
and summarizes the results of tasks performed over the period 1 February
1973 to 31 January 1974.
The ongoing activities under this contract have been reported to the
Planetary Programs Office at four regularly scheduled review meetings. In
addition, individual task reports have been prepared and presentations have
been made to a wide audience at NASA headquarters and at technical meetings,
on the results of individual tasks. Limited quantities of the following reports,
annotated presentation brochures and papers are available:
Manpower/Cost Estimation Model for Automated Planetary
Projects. SAI-120-C3
Space Shuttle and Planetary Missions (White Paper).
1979 Pioneer Mars Missions. SAl-120-MI
A Comparison of Advanced Propulsion Capabilities for Future
Planetary Missions (AIAA 73-587).
Measurement Error Analysis in Determination of Small Body
Gravity Fields (AIAA 74-218).
Comet Encke Fly-by with Asteroid Rendezvous Mission (in press-
Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets).
Advanced Planning Activity Summary Report SAI-120-M2.
The following sections summarize the results of the three contract
tasks relating to cost estimation research, the planetary missions
handbook and advanced planning activities, respectively. The total value c
the contract was $169, 000 and included a scheduled effort of 5976 man-hou
The distribution of the effort is indicated in each task summary.
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ESTIMATION
RESEARCH
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1. Cost Estimation Research. (13 Man Months)
The purpose of this task is to continue the development of the planetary
spacecraft cost estimation model which had been started uinder a previous
NASA contract. Two major functions have been performed in that the financial
data base has been extended and reorganized considerably and the labor estima-
tion relationships (LERs) in the estimation model have been completely revised.
The manpower/cost estimation model now developed incorporates two signifi-
cant improvements on past practice. First it is based on a detailed level of
financial analysis of over 30 million raw data points which are then compacted
by over three orders of magnitude to the level at which the model is applicable.
Secondthe major parameter of expenditure is manpower (specifically direct
labor hours) for all spacecraft subsystem and technical support categories.
The resultant model, which is applicable at a pre-Phase A project level is able
to provide a mean absolute error of less than ten percent for the eight programs
comprising the model data base.
The cost data used for the model was in a form that permitted analysis
below the subsystem level and allowed for the adjustment of sulbsystem defini-
tions to ensure compatibility among different projects. The data profile con-
sisted of a financial breakdown structure which listed cost accounts associated
with a given spacecraft cost element. Sluch accounts generally consisted of
wages, salaries, rental services, tooling, material purchases, etc. Data was
then acquired on the direct labor hours (DLH) charged to each spacecraft cost
element by engineers, scientists, technicians, administrative and manufacturing
personnel, and clerical workers. One recognizes that direct labor hours and
direct labor dollars are essentially perfectly correlated in each cost element
via the appropriate wage rate.
Raw data obtained over the eight projects consisted of 648 financial
categories and 4843 spacecraft cost elements spread across 327 prime and sub-
contracts. In total, some 11. 5 million expenditure items were examined.
These acco'mted for 99.7% of the actual total of $1.65 billion expenditulres for
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the eight projects (Surveyor, Lunar Orbiter, Mariner '64, '69, '71, Pioneer
F/G, Viking Lander and Orbiter). Additional data is being collected for at-
mospheric probes and is being used to recalibrate the estimation relationships.
The most immediate result of this analysis was the considerable insight
it gave into where the money is actually spent in a space project. In addition
however, it was recognized that the rigidity of the government accounting
system in fact was extremely beneficial in analyzing data over a range of
projects spanning one and a half decades in time. The common denominator
of the NASA cost reporting system is the cost incurred in direct labor hours
(DLH) which is typically 30% of the total project cost. It is from this base
that the allowable overhead, G & A, and fee are computed by preset ratios.
The category of other direct costs (ODC), typically 15% of the total project
costs, is a secondary denominator for costs actually incurred in a project.
In fact, these two, DLH & ODC, are the only two categories by which a con-
tractor can claim payment for his work on a project. Because direct labor
hours, with ODC's, are the only parameters used to express the investment
of time and materials in the spacecraft, and because they are so uniformly
reported, then they should be directly related to the overall cost of the project.
Forecasting manhours has several distinct advantages over directly
forecasting total project dollars. Among these are separation of estimates
from inflation factors and an ease in costing low volume production. Infla-
tionary factors are difficult to formulate for total project costs and often fail
to represent accurately actual financial conditions within the industry. The
space industry has not yet been able to use mass production techniques and
thus the total cost of each completed item is not substantially decreased
through additional production. Hence, project hardware cost is directly re-
lated to the manhours involved in development, fabrication and testing. The
present average direct labor ratio is 29. 6% with a standard deviation of 0. 5%.
Also, the effect of learning and inheritance can be analyzed and measured
more easily in terms of manpower requirements.
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The division between non-recurring and recurring direct labor is not
uniquely definable. However, the analysis has identified the completion date of
the Proof Test Model (PTM) to be the best demarcation point for this division
of labor. The PTM is a clearly defined point in a project, particularly from a
historical standpoint. It is at least plausible that about as much recurring cost
is incurred before the PTM as non-recurring cost after the PTM since work
on the first flight article begins near the time of PTM acceptance. Hence, for
the purpose of modeling, the PTM represents a very good project milestone
marking the transition from non-recurring to recurring manpower.
In using the extended and modified manpower and financial data base to
reconstruct the cost estimation model, several requirements were identified:
i) The input parameters should be consistent with (pre) Phase A
definition of subsystems and mission operations, e.g., weight,
power, event times, etc.
ii) The fmunctional form of LER's should be simple algebraic expressions,
e. g., linear, power law, exponential.
iii) The number of coefficients in a given LER should be limited to
improve statistical significance of data fit.
iv) The LER should derive from an unbiased regression analysis,
i. e., the balancing of plus and minus errors to yield a near-zero
mean error.
In addition, two basic premises should always be kept in mind by the cost analyst
or the user of the estimation model:
0 A cost model does not represent "truth" but only a simplified,
empirical approximation to actual cause and effect.
* Due to the phenomena of averaging, total project cost will be more
accurately estimated than individual elements when viewed from a
statistical standpoint of percentage error.
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A correlary to the averaging premise is, of course, that reduction of variance
of fit in individual elements will further reduce error variance in total cost.
The cost estimation model uses 21 spacecraft/mission parameters which,
for the most part, are weights of key subsystem elements. Nonwithstanding
the desire to model on the basis of performance parameters, weight has been a
meaningful composite parameter that correlates fairly well with design/
development complexity and effort. In this sense the present approach is not
munlike earlier cost estimation models. Regarding the question of statistical
significance, the ratio of total data points to the total number of model coeffi-
cients is approximately 3 to 1. By analogy this is akin to fitting a straight line
(or power function) through 6 data points. The 21 model inputs are given in
Table 1. 1. The labor estimating relationships are given in Table 1.2.
The two additional parameters needed to convert direct labor hours into
total project cost are the wage rate ($/hr.) and the percentage of project dollars
invested in labor. The wage rate can be modeled on the basis of historical data
and the model can be used for extrapolation purposes within careful limitations.
In pursuing the modeling approach, it was fomund that by taking the fiscal year
date at which funding reached the 50% level one could obtain an accurate con-
version of manhours to actual dollar expenditure. A regression analysis applied
to all eight projects resulted in the following equation for average rate across
all project categories.
Wage Rate ($/hr.) = 4.67 (1. 05 1 3 )(MY - 1 964.5)
where MY is the median fiscal date for a given project. This expression repre-
sents an average 5. 13%/year inflation rate over the last decade which is also
typical of the general economy. The acculracy of fit is measured by a standard
deviation of only 19 /hr.
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TABLE 1.1
Cost Model Inputs
TL Date of First Launch (Calendar Yr.)
TM Fiscal Year for Dollar Values
NFA Number of Flight Articles
WSI Total Weight of Structure Subsystem (lbs.)
WS2 Weight of Mechanisms and Landing Gear (lbs.)
WS3 Weight of Thermal Control Pyro and Cabling (lbs.)
WP1 Propulsion System Dry Weight Excluding Throttable
Liquid Vernier for Landers (lbs.)
WP2 Liquid Vernier Dry Weight (lbs.)
WP3 Aerodeceleration Subsystem Weight (lbs.)
WG1 Total Weight of Guidance/Control Subsystem (lbs.)
WG2 Weight of Radar in G/C Subsystem (lbs.)
WC1 Weight of Radio Frequency Comm. Subsystem (lbs.)
WC2 Weight of Data Handling Subsystem (lbs.)
WC3 Weight of Antennas
WEP1 Weight of Power Subsystem Excluding RTG's (lbs.)
NU Number of RTG Units per Spacecraft
FL RTG Fuel Loading (Thermal Watts)
WSE1 Total Weight of Science Experiments (lbs.)
WSE2 Weight of Lander Surface Experiments in WSE1 having
Significant Sampling/Processing Operations (lbs.)
PPL Pixels per Line of TV (or equivalent visual imaging)
PU RTG Unit Power-End of Life (Watts)
INHER 15 Inheritance Factors, Values between 0 (No Inheritance)
and 1.0 (Maximum Inheritance)
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TABLE 1.2
LER's For Spacecraft Subsystem Categories
Structure
0.691 0.507 0.427
Non-Landers NRST = 6.68 (WS2) + 11.9 (WS3) +28.4(WSI-WS2-WS3)
1.35 0.507 0.427
Landers NRST = 1. 35 WS2) + 11.9 (WS3) +28.4 (WS1-WS2-WS3)
RST =0.109 (NFA)(NRsT)
Propulsion 0.5 0.5 0.5
NRp = 21.6 (WP1) + 34.1 (WP2) + 14.4 (WP3)
Rp = 0. 148 (NFA) (NRp)
Guidance and Control
0.722 0.607
NRGC = 17.8 (WG1) + 69.6 (WG2)
RGC = 0. 13 8 (NFA)(NRGC
Communications
0.670 0.5
NR C = 7. 70(WC1) + 23.0 (WC2) + 17.0 (WC3)
RC = 0. 180 (NFA) (NRC
Power
NREP = 0. 643 (WEP) + 152
REP = 0. 150 (NFA)(NREP
Science Experiments
NRSE = 0. 110(PPL) + 1. 56 (WSE1) + 12.1 (WSE2) + 220
RSE = 0.237 (NFA) (NRSE)
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TABLE 1.2 (Cont'd.)
LER's For Technical Support Categories
DLHs = Total direct labor hours of all subsystem categories.
(in thousands of hours)
Program Management -4
2.83 X 10 DLHss
DLH = 94 ePM
Systems Analysis and Engineering
-8 2.76
DLHSA E = 1. 94 X 10 (DLHSS)
Test and Quality Assurance/Reliability
-4
2.82 X 10 DLHss
DLHT + DLHQAR = 226e
T QAR
Assembly and Integration
-4 1.47
DLHAI = 7.82 X 10 (DLHSS)
Ground Equipment and Launch/Flight Operations
-4
-0.392 1.73X10 DLH
DLHGE + DLHLF O = 1360 T e S
GE LFO
Where T = Launch Date - 1960.6
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A model is being developed for inheritance as indicated in Figure 1.1.
The major distinction made in modeling inheritance is whether or not there
is any impact on the research and development component of the cost of a
subsystem. Large savings are only achieved if this non-recurring cost com-
ponent can be reduced. The extreme case of inheritance is one of adding a
flight article to a project in which case the non-recurring cost assigned to the
additional flight article is zero.
The complete model has been programmed for use with a mini-computer
located in the SAI offices (Hewlett-Packard 9830) so that very short turn
around times can be achieved. A typical output is shown in Figure 1. 2 which
lists:
1) the 21 inpult parameters
2) the computed average wage rate and labor percentage
3) the computed direct labor hours and cost for thirteen categories
4) the compulted total cost of the project for two flight articles
5) the computed cost for additional flight articles
6) the estimated RTG costs
7) the computed cost spread for 4 and 5 years.
It should be noted that the project data base modeled does not include contractor
fee, NASA Headquarters and Center management cost, or launch vehicle cost.
This may explain any reconciliation between the "actual" costs listed and the
reader's mental recognition of slightly different numbers. The initial goal of
10% average error has been met. Olt of the 8 projects, 4 are estimated with-
in 5% while 7 projects are estimated within 12%. Since Sulrveyor represented
the most complex unmanned space project undertaken in the early 1960's, and
derived essentially zero inheritance from previous experience, it is not too
surprising that the present model underestimates its cost by 35%.
A final result of interest is the distribution of cost element errors
itemized by project and category. Figure 1. 3 summarizes this data in the form
of a statistical histogram. The density function has a fairly sharp spike
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"NORMAL" OUTPUT FROM
MANPOWER/COST MODEL
85% Non-Rec 15% Rec
LOW COST
PHILOSOPHY DESIGN TO COST
YES L BUY NO
X0/b% of Sub Sys
YES ECH/DESIGN NO
YES PART AT? NO
Save 0.8X% of Non Rec Save 0.2Y% Save 0.2Z%i
plus No Saving
Save 0. 2X% of Rec of Non Rec of Rec.
FIGURE 1.1 LOGIC FOR INHERITANCE COST SAVINGS
PROJECT NAME SAMPLE OUTPUT FOR ANNUAL REPORT 120-A-1
PROJECT DESCRIPTION WEIGHT UNITS(POUNDS),POWER UNITS(WATTS)
LAUNCH DATE (Di) 1985.1 TOTAL STRUCT. WT(S1) 427.0 G/C RADAR WT (G2) 0.0
FISCAL WAGE DATE(D2) 1974.0 MECHANISMS/LG WT(S2) 50.0 RADIO COMM. WT (Ci) 155.0
FLIGHT ARTICLES (NI) 2.0 TC PYRO.CABL.WT (S3) 115.0 DATA HANDLING WT(C2) 121.0
NON-RTG POWER WT(W1) 110.0 PROP.SYS DRY WT (Pl) 427.0 ANTENNA WT (C3) - 50.0
RTG UNIT PER S/C(N2) 4.0 VERNIER DRY WT (P2) 0.0 TOTAL SCIENCE WT(Q1) 160.0
RTG EOL UNIT PWR.(U) 125.0 AERODECEL WT (P3) 0.0 SURF. SCIENCE WT(Q2) 0.0
RTG FUEL LOADING(L1) 2200.0 TOTAL G/C WT (Gl) 209.0 PIXELS/LINE (TV)(Q3) 1500.0
INHERITANCE % STR PROP G/C COMM POW SCI
EXACT REPEAT(BLOCK BUY) 25% 25% 25% 50% 50% 25%
TECHNOL/DES(NON-IDENTICAL S/C) 75% 75% 65% 50% 50% 50%
PARTS, COMPONENTS,MATERIALS 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COST DIRECT LABOR NON-RECURRING RECURRING
(MILLIONS) (000 HRS) (000 HRS) (000 HRS)
SUBSYSTEM CATEGORIES NORM INHER NORM INHER NORM INHER NORM INHER
STRUCTURE 16.6 11.7 655 461 538 350 117 111
PROPULSION 14.7 10.5 578 416 446 290 132 126
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL 27.3 19.9 1074 785 842 564 232 221
COMMUNICATIONS 65.1 39.4 2564 1554 1885 943 679 611
POWER 7.3 4.4 290 172 223 111 67 60
SCIENCE 23.7 18.5 935 730 634 444 301 286
SUBTOTAL 154.7 104.5 6097 4116 4569 2702 1528 1414
SUPPORT CATEGORIES
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 13.4 7.6 528 301
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS/ENG. 13.8 4.7 543 184
TEST + QUALITY ASSURANCE 32.0 18.3 1261 721
ASSEMBLY AND INTEGRATION 7.3 4.1 287 161
GROUND EQUIP.+ FLIGHT OPS. 28.3 20.1 1114 791
SUBTOTAL 94.7 54.8 3733 2158
TOTAL (WITHOUT RTG) 249.4 159.2 9829 6275 RTG COST = 11.8
TOTAL 261.3 171.1 ADDL. FLIGHT UNIT = 43.1
FISCAL YEAR 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
5 YEAR SPREAD 25.23 45.63 49.00 59.35 51.19 17.79
4 YEAR SPREAD 0.00 29.49 100.73 83.95 32.44 1.40
NUMBER OF ELEMENTS (%)
60
ERROR =ESTIMATE- ACTUAL
50
MEAN ERROR =-2.0($ MIL)
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR = 3.7 ($ MIL)
40
30
20
10
-20 -16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20
COST ELEMENT ERROR (4 MIL)
FIG. 1.3 DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATION ERRORS FOR 88 COST ELEMENTS
(11 CATEGORIES X 8 PROJECTS)
centered around zero error but the tailoff is less rapid than would be desired.
Estimation errors associated with Surveyor are mainly responsible for the long
tailoff and the negative bias in the distribution. The mean error and mean
absolute error taken over the other 7 projects are, respectively, -$0. 4 million
and $2.3 million.
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MISSION
HANDBOOK
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2. Planetary Missions Handbook (5 Man Months)
The purpose of the Planetary Missions Handbook is to provide NASA
mission planners with basic planetary, opportunity dependent, performance
data. A high priority has been placed on the use of the Handbook as a ready
source of data and thus we have emphasized its clarity, organization and
ease of usage.
A first edition has been produced on a previous NASA contract and is
in the form of a compilation of graphs - 80 in all. The work performed
under this contract relates still to the outer planets but extends the oppor-
tunities to 1990 and includes multiple swing-by missions. Further, although
launch vehicle performance curves are an important part of the Handbook,
they are supplemented by tables of data which allow much easier inter-
polation. In the course of the development of the Handbook data we have
developed an effective computational scheme for use with our in-house mini-
computer (Hewlett-Packard 9830), so that where more accurate data is re-
quired than can be provided by interpolation, we can provide a quick response
analytical capability.
Basic trajectory data has had to be computed for all added missions,
using the SPARC computer program, because the NASA Special Publication
SP-35, used as a source for the first edition, does not go beyond 1986. The
SEP data has all been generated using the CHEBYTOP Computer Program.
The planetary missions to be included in the handbook are shown in
Table 2.1 with the departure and orbit capture propulsion assignments.
Since SEP trajectory data is relatively expensive to generate, launch window
data has been restricted to a single, median opportunity for each of the four
outer planet SEP missions. The results are used to measure performance
degradation in terms of payload loss as a function of launch window size.
This degradation (typically 5%) will be applied, with acceptable accuracy,
over the other launch opportunities for each mission type. A single nuclear
electric mission for a Uranus Orbiter is also included.
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TABLE 2.1
PLANETARY MISSIONS HANDBOOK PROPULSION ASSIGNMENTS
Propulsion Calendar Launch Year
Missions System
Application 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
Jupiter Flybys Launch CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP
and Orbiters -I
Orbit ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR
Capture SSR SSR SSR SSR SSR SSR SSR SSR SSR SSR
Saturn Flybys Launch & CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP
and Orbiters Transfer SEP SEP SEP SEP SEP SEP SEP SEP SEP SEP
GSEP GSEP GSEP GSEP GSEP GSEP
Orbit ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR ESR
Capture SSR SSR SSR SSR SSR SSR SSR SSR SSR SSR
Uranus Flybys Launch & CRP CRP CRP
and Orbiter Transfer SEP SEP SEP
GSEP GSEP
NEP
Orbit ESR ESR ESR
Capture SSR SSR SSR
J/U/N Launch & CRP CRP CRP
Swingbys Transfer SEP SEP SEP
S/U/N Launch & CRP CRP CRP CRP CRP
Swingbys Transfer SEP SEP SEP SEP SEP
NOMENCLATURE: CRP - Chemical Rocket Propulsion; SEP - Solar Electric Propulsion (20KW), GSEP - (40KW);
NEP - Nuclear Electric Propulsion (120KW); ESR - Earth Storable Retro (Isp = 285 SEC);
SSR - Space Storable Retro (Isp = 375 SEC)
The propulsion options to be presented for all missions used in the
Handbook are shown in Table 2.2 as a function of launch year. Up until 1980,
before the Shuttle is available, only one launch vehicle is used, between 1980
and 1984 a total of eight options are available and beyond 1985 six options are
considered. However, since the time when this list was approved by NASA,
there has been a series of interagency (NASA/DOD) discussions aimed at
developing a common OOS stage as an intermediate Tug (see Advanced
Planning Task Number 14). Since generation of mission performance data for
the Handbook is awaiting the publication of the 1974 edition of the Launch
Vehicle Estimating Factors Handbook, it is intended that the second through
eighth launch vehicles in Table 2.2 be reviewed with NASA at that time. The
performance of a final set of launch vehicle selections will be incorporated
into the final data run.
For Jupiter, Saturn and Uranus orbiter missions, orbit payload perfor-
mance tables will be provided in addition to the standard payload versus
flight time performance curves. An example of this is shown in Table 2.3
for a ballistic 1981/82 Jupiter Orbiter mission. Launch and retro specifica-
tions are at the top of Table 2. 3. The first section of the table contains net
useful payload in-orbit data for a range of orbit periods (15, 30 and 60 earth
days), a range of flight times (500 - 900 earth days) and a range of periapse
distances measured in planet radii from the center of the planet. The second
section gives the associated total retro mass for the same range of orbit
periods, flight times and periapse distances. The retro mass assumes a
rubber tank and is included to indicate the gross weight distribution be-
tween the retro and the payload as it approaches the planet. Interpola-
tion is possible for intermediate orbit periods, flight times, and periapse
distances. For each launch opportunity, one such table is included per
launch vehicle/retro combination. In addition, one graph is included showing
curves of payload versus flight time for all launch vehicle selections, for one
orbital period and periapse distance.
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TABLE 2.2
PLANETARY MISSIONS HANDBOOK LAUNCH/TRANSFER PROPULSION AVAILABILITY
PROPULSION SYSTEMS 1976 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
1. TITAN IIIE/CENTAUR/TE 364-4*
2. TITAN IIIE/CENTAUR/SEP(20KW)
3. SHUTTLE/CENTAUR/TE 364-4
4. SHUTTLE/CENTAUR/SEP(20KW)
5. SHUTTLE/ITUG(E)/TE 364-4
6. SHUTTLE/ITUG(E)/SEP(20KW)
7. SHUTTLE/ITUG(R)/KICK(APC)
8. SHUTTLE/ITUG(R)/KICK(APC)/SEP (20KW)
9. SHUTTLE/TUG(E)/TE 364-4
10. SHUTTLE/TUG(E)/SEP(20KW)
11. SHUTTLE/TUG(E)/GSEP(40KW)
12. SHUTTLE/TUG(R)/KICK(APC)
13. SHUTTLE/TUG(R)/KICK(APC)/SEP(20KW)
14. SHUTTLE/TUG(R)/KICK(APC)/GSEP(40KW)
*TE 364-4 ADDED ON REQUIRED BASIS THROUGHOUT
TABLE 2. 3
IJFP I TER OR:I I TER F A'I . FERFCFIRMAN E
LAUNCH OPPORTUNITY 1981/82
LAUNCH WINDOW 21 DAYS
LAUNCH VEHICLE SHUTTLE/CENTAUR/BURNERII(2300)
RETRO SYSTEM EARTH STORABLE(ISP=290 SEC)
EXCESS DV 250 M/SEC
-------------- ---------------------------------------------------------
ORBIT TRANSFER NET USEFUL PAYLOAD (KG)
PERIOD TIME
(DAYS) (DAYS) (YRS) RP=1.1 RP=2 RP=3 RP=4 RP=6 RP=8 RP=10
------------------- ------ ----- ------ ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
-----
15.00 500 1.37 268 158 85 37 0 0 0
15.00 600 1.64 597 446 338 260 152 79 25
15.00 700 1.92 856 693 570 479 345 250 177
15.00 800 2.19 1007 847 722 628 486 382 300
15.00 900 2.46 987 842 728 640 508 409 330
30.00 500 1.37 308 200 127 77 13 0 0
30.00 600 1.64 671 530 427 352 244 170 115
30.00 700 1.92 956 813 702 617 491 399 327
30.00 800 2.19 1122 987 879 795 668 571 494
30.00 900 2.46 1099 979 883 808 691 602 529
60.00 500 1.37 335 229 156 106 40 0 0
60.00 600 1.64 721 589 490 417 312 238 182
60.00 700 1.92 1024 895 793 715 597 509 440
60.00 800 2.19 1200 1083 989 914 800 712 641
60.00 900 2.46 1175 1074 991 926 824 744 680
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ORBIT TRANSFER TOTAL RETRO MASS (KG)
PERIOD TIME
(DAYS) (DAYS) (YRS) RP=1.1 RP=2 RP=3 RP=4 RP=6 RP=8 RP=10
------------------- ------ ----- ------ ---- ---- 
---- ------- -----
15.00 500 1.37 708 818 891 939 0 0 0
15.00 600 1.64 824 975 1083 1161 1269 1342 1396
15.00 706 1.92 837 1000 1122 1214 1348 1443 1516
15.00 800 2.19 809 969 1093 1188 1330 1434 1516
15.00 900 2.46 733 878 992 1080 1212 1311 1390
30.00 500 1.37 668 776 849 899 963 0 0
30.00 600 1.64 750 890 994 1069 1177 1251 1306
30.00 700 1.92 737 880 991 1076 1202 1294 1322
30.00 800 2.19 694 829 937 1021 1184 1245 1322
30.00 900 2.46 621 741 837 913 1029 1118 1191
60.00 500 1.37 641 747 820 870 936 0 0
60.00 600 1.64 700 832 931 1004 1109 1183 1239
60.00 700 1.92 669 798 900 978 1096 1184 1253
60.00 800 2.19 616 733 227 902 1016 1104 1175
60.00 900 2.46 545 646 729 794 896 975 1040
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The assemblage of the various sections of the Handbook is shown in
Figure 2. 1. It is organized by mission type. Within each type, a table of
opportunities is included. For each opportunity the appropriate performance
graphs and tables are presented. Thus the ordering system maximizes the
users ability to find directly the information of interest.
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RP(U) vs TF(U)
ORBITER MISSIONS
HANDBOOK,8,90
SATUN/NASA0
FLYBY MISSIONS
OPPORTUNITY TA
J U P I T E R (76-90)
S/U/N SWB (80,-85)
RP(U) vs TF(U)
RP(J) vs TF(U)
11979 ML vs TF(U)
rT F(J, U, N) vs C3
1OPPORTUNITY TABLE -
J/U/N SWB (1979, 80.81)
INTRODUCTION-
PLANETARY
MISSIONS
HANDBOOK
PLANETARY PROGRAMS -
OSS/NASA
FIGURE 2.1 PLANETARY MISSIONS HANDBOOK LAYOUT (2ND EDITION)
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ADVANCED
PLANNING
SACTIVITY
3. Advanced Planning Activity (19 Man Months)
This task area has been a focal point for the day-to-day interaction
between NASA Planetary Programs Office and the SAI staff. Unscheduled fast
response jobs have been a normal part of this task area throughout the contract
year and in all cases the required response has been met. The tasks have
varied from straight forward exchanges of technical data by phone, to short
one or two page responses transmitted by mail or telecopier, to more signi-
ficant memoranda and finally to mini-mission studies. The effort expended
per task has varied from approximately one hour to almost six man-months.
This report summarizes a total of 17 of the more significant advanced planning
analyses, all of which were the subject of written submissions at the time they
were completed. Table 1 gives a summary of these advanced planning tasks.
1. Jupiter Orbiter Performance Comparison - Earth Storable
versus Space Storable Retro Propulsion
The orbited payload capability was examined for three Jupiter
opportunities - 1980, 1981/82 and 1983. Payload performance was
evaluated as a function of flight time to Jupiter using Titan III E/Centaur/
B II and Shuttle/Centaur/B II launch vehicles. A 30-day orbit with
periapse at 3R was assumed in the analysis. It was concluded that space-
storable retro propulsion provides from 75 to 100 kg more orbit payload
than earth-storable propulsion when combined with the Titan III E/
Centaur/B II during the three opportunities examined. Using the Shuttle/
Centaur/B II this advantage with space storable propulsion increases to
about 150 kg. It was further concluded that the combination of the Titan
launch vehicle with an earth-storable retro propulsion system is marginal
for MJO missions. The Shuttle launch vehicle has sufficient additional
capability to rate MJO missions for the period 1980 - 83 as acceptable
with earth storable retro propulsion.
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Table 1.
SUMMARY OF ADVANCED PLANNING ACTIVITY
TASK DATES TASK TITLE SUBMITTED TO
1. FEB. '73 Jupiter Orbiter Performance Comparison - Earth Storable NASA HQ.
versus Space Storable Retro Propulsion
2. FEB. '73 Jupiter Orbiter Performance Depth with Fixed and
Expanded MM '71 Retro Propulsion Subsystems JPL
3. FEB. - MAY '73 1983 Venus and 1986 Uranus/Neptune SEP Missions MSFC/RI
4. FEB. - MAY '73 1989 Venus and 1981/82 Encke Rendezvous SEP Missions MSFC/RI
5. MAR. - MAY '73 1989 Saturn and 1989 Asteroid (METIS) Rendezvous SEP
Missions MSFC/RI
6. MAR. - MAY '73 1987 Mercury SEP Mission MSFC/RI
7. MAR. - MAY '73 Space Shuttle and Planetary Missions NASA HQ.
8. APRIL - MAY '73 Pioneer Saturn and Uranus Entry Probe Mission Dates NASA HQ. /OPSAC
9. MAY '73 Comet Kohoutek Fly-By Mission Parameters NASA HQ.
10. JUNE '73 Recovered Tug Earth Escape Performance MSFC
11. JULY - NOV. '73 Titan Atmosphere Workshop ARC /NASA HQ.
12. OCT. '73 Inputs for Electric Propulsion Conference NASA HQ.
SUMMARY OF ADVANCED PLANNING ACTIVITY (Cont'd.)
TASK DATES TASK TITLE SUBMITTED TO
13. OCT. '73 1985 Saturn Orbiter Performance Curves NASA HQ.
14. OCT. - DEC. '73 OOS Tug Evaluation NASA HQ.
15. NOV. '73 Ballistic Rendezvous with Encke 81/82 NASA HQ.
16. NOV. '73 Comet Encke 80 Fly-By - Asteroid Rendezvous Mission NASA HQ.
17. NOV. - JAN. '73 Pioneer Mars 1979 Mission Options NASA HQ. /ARC
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2. Jupiter Orbiter Performance Depth with Fixed and Expanded
MM '71 Retro Propulsion Subsystems
The total burnout mass capability of a Jupiter orbiter was examined
with a MM '71 retro propulsion subsystem. The analysis was restricted
to an 800-day mission launched during the 1981/82 Jupiter opportunity.
Both the Titan IIIE/Centaur/BII and Shuttle/Centaur/BII launch vehicles
were considered. The purpose of this analysis was to investigate the per-
formance depth of the MM '71 retro propulsion subsystem design. Depth
of performance was measured by the ability of the retro system to deliver
acceptable orbiter burnout mass to a fixed period 30-day orbit with in-
creasing periapse radius. Results were presented which showed that
less than 600 kg was available for the orbiter (exclusive of the propulsion
subsystem) for all orbit periapse radii greater than 2 R if the Titan IIIE/
Centaur/BII was used for launch. The same conclusion applies to a
Shuttle/Centaur/BII launched mission if the propellant capacity is limited
by the present MM '71 tank size. However, by increasing the propellant
capacity the orbit periapse radius can go as high as 6.75 Rj before the
net orbiter mass (excluding the propulsion subsystem) falls below
600 kg. The required propellant capacity at this point would be approxi-
mately 2.25 times as large as that of the present design. From this
brief analysis it was concluded that acceptable application of the MM '71
retro propulsion system to an MJO mission would almost certainly re-
quire expanded propellant capacity. Doubling the tankage, i. e. four tanks
instead of two, combined with Shuttle/Centaur/BII launches would provide
considerable propulsion flexibility for MJO mission planning.
3. 1983 Venus and 1986 Uranus/Neptune SEP Missions
Data was generated for a 20 kw SEP stage for both missions and
also a 15 kw stage for the Venus Mission. Three launch vehicles were
considered: Shuttle/Tug (I, R)*/SEP, Shuttle/Tug (I, R)/Kick/SEP and
*(I, R) = intermediate, reusable.
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and Shuttle/Centaur/SEP. For each option the initial mass,propellant
mass and net approach mass were provided as a function of flight time.
The analysis was performed as an input to a study being performed by
Rockwell International for Marshall Space Flight Center.
4. 1989 Venus and 1981/82 Encke Rendezvous Missions
Data was generated for a 20 kw SEP stage for both missions.
Three launch vehicles were considered: Shuttle/TUG (I, R)/SEP,
Shuttle/Tug (I, R)/Kick/SEP and Shuttle/Centaur/SEP. For each option
the initial mass, propellant mass and net approach mass were given as
a function of flight time. In addition, for Encke rendezvous, SEP propul-
sion times between 750 and 1100 days were considered.
5. 1989 Saturn and 1989 Asteroid (METIS) Rendezvous SEP Missions
Data was generated for a 20 kw SEP stage for both missions. For
the Saturn mission the launch vehicles included were the Shuttle/Tug
(I, R)/Kick/SEP and the Shuttle/Centaur/SEP. For the asteroid ren-
dezvous mission all three candidate launch vehicles are used in off-
loaded conditions. For each option the initial mass, the propellant mass,
and the net approach mass were given as a function of flight time.
Asteroid Metis is a fairly large interesting asteroid having a reddish
color and a high albedo.
6. 1987 Mercury SEP Mission
Tabular data was provided for a 450-day mission to Mercury using
a 20 kw SEP stage. The launch vehicle considered was a Shuttle/Tug
(I, R). The values for initial mass and approach mass are given as
"near optimum" due to the difficulty and expense of obtaining converged
Mercury trajectories. Propulsion times of 450, 400 and 350 days were
considered.
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7. Space Shuttle and Planetary Missions
This white paper was prepared for the Planetary Programs Office
and was used as an input to the Space Science Board Summer Study
investigating the applications of the Space Shuttle.
The purpose of the white paper was to review and discuss the appli-
cation of the Space Shuttle system to planetary missions, particularly
during its introductory years of service, 1980-85. It was the intent to
relate anticipated planetary mission requirements with candidate Shuttle-
based escape stage capabilities. In addition, several specific mission
point designs were detailed on the basis of a Shuttle/Centaur launch
system.
The first section of the white paper presents the current mission
model and the rationale related to these future plans. Section 2 includes
a brief description of the Shuttle and its operations for planetary missions.
Several escape-stage alternatives are presented including the Centaur,
the recoverable and expendable Tugs. An escape-stage capture evalua-
tion is presented for nine different planet, comet, and asteroid missions
assuming a 20 KW solar electric propulsion (SEP) stage is available as
needed. Section 3 is comprised of three mission descriptions assuming
a Shuttle/Centaur launch system is used for these missions. The missions
considered are: (a) 1980 Pioneer Saturn/Uranus Entry Probes, (b) 1981
Encke SEP Rendezvous, and (c) 1981/82 Mariner Jupiter Orbiters.
Benefits of using the Shuttle/Centaur rather than the Titan IIID/Centaur
are discussed.
8. Pioneer Saturn and Uranus Entry Probe Mission
This task was performed to provide immediate follow-up data on
an alternative Pioneer/Probe mission set which had been presented to the
Outer Planets Science Advisory Committee (OPSAC). The targeting
flexibility was developed for the mission set: 1980 PJU, 1981 PS, and
PSU with particular regard to the 1982 PSU targeting options prior to
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Saturn encounter. Data was provided on swing-by radii, trip times to
all targets and launch window constraints for Pioneer class missions
using the Titan/Centaur/TE 364-4 launch vehicle.
9. Comet Kohoutek Flyby Mission Parameters
This task provided optimum flyby trajectory parameters for Comet
Kohoutek as a function of launch date during the six months from May to
November. Encounter dates occurred early in 1974 as the comet passed
through its descending node after perihelion. It was noted that the
trajectories presented go out as far as 1. 8 AU prior to (or at) encounter,
with spacecraft-earth communication distance at flyby reaching 2 AU.
A plot of injected payload performance versus launch date was presented
for three launch vehicles: 1) the Scout E, 2) the Delta 2914, and
3) the Atlas D/Centaur/TE 364-4. The Scout E is obviously too small
a launch vehicle for sensible spacecraft payloads. A spacecraft capable
of communicating with earth from a distance of up to 2 AU probably
weighs at least 200 kg including science instruments. For 200 kg payload
the Delta 2914 could meet Kohoutek flyby mission launch requirements
until 11 August 1973; the Atlas D/Centaur/TE 364-4 could do so until
8 September.
10. Recovered Tug Earth Escape Performance
A performance graph was prepared to compare the performance of
a Shuttle launched recovered Tug with a Titan/Centaur. The recovered
Tug options included the addition of a Burner II and an APC kick stage
individually and in combination. In all cases the performance was con-
siderably below an expendable Tug.
11. Titan Atmosphere Workshop
The workshop was convened at Ames Research Center under the
chairmanship of D. M. Hunten. At the request of NASA Headquarters,
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purpose was to define, as far as now possible, the atmosphere of Titan
for use in the planning of future missions to that body. Titan's promi-
nence is so recent that all the active workers could easily meet in a
small room. More than half these people were actually present, and a
good coverage of the appropriate disciplines was obtained.
Titan offers a unique opportunity in solar system exploration. It
is the smallest known body with an atmosphere. In terms of spacecraft
entry dynamics, it has the most accessible atmosphere in the solar
system. It has dark reddish clouds which many workers believe are
composed of organic compounds. It has the highest ratio of methane to
hydrogen of all known reducing atmospheres, making an environment in
some respects like that of the primitive earth at the time of the origin
of life. It probably has the only surface of all the bodies beyond Mars
with atmospheres that entry spacecraft can reach. In terms of plane-
tary rotation rate, Titan's atmospheric circulation may occupy a unique
niche between the dynamics of Venus and the earth. The surface tempera-
.ture may be 150-2000K or warmer, and one model suggests an ocean of
liquid methane and ammonia. While at the present this is the merest
speculation, the presence of life on Titan is by no means out of the
question.
Nearly two of the three days of the workshop were devoted to re-
view papers, more than half of which concerned, as yet, unpublished
results of Titanian studies and observations. The whole of our present
knowledge of Titan was found to be clearly inadequate for engineering
purposes (specifically atmospheric modeling), but it was equally clear
that a vast improvement is feasible with today's observational techniques.
These include ultra-violet and infrared spectroscopy, infrared and
microwave radiometry, and stellar occultations. Observational and
modeling techniques that have been used to study the planets have just
begun to be applied to Titan. Many important properties are accessible
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which will yield a considerable improvement in our knowledge of Titan
in the near future. Half a dozen recommendations for immediate work,
both at the telescope and in the laboratory were generated by the work-
shop participants.
It was recognized, however, that a thorough characterization of
the environment of Titan -- and, in particular, studies of the tantalizing
questions of organic chemistry and surface morphology -- must await
spacecraft investigations at or near Titan. With respect to mission
planning, it was concluded that although the Mariner Jupiter/Saturn
flyby missions, presently planned for launch in 1976, do not appear
essential to the preparation of an atmospheric probe mission to Titan,
the inclusion of Titan flyby objectives on the MJS missions would be most
useful. It was also the consensus of the participants that the present
outer planets atmospheric probe mission plan does not have sufficient
emphasis for Titan. In particular, the three-mission set of Pioneer-
Entry Probe missions includes Titan as a possible target of opportunity
after Saturn and Uranus. A five-mission set of Pioneer-Probe's, with
two launches dedicated for Titan, seems more appropriate. Questions
regarding relevant probe science and sterilization were also discussed.
As editor for the Workshop, there was considerable coordination
required during the meeting to obtain preliminary copies and transcripts
of all presentations and discussions. This was followed by a concerted
effort to compile a final draft version of the proceedings of the Workshop
within a matter of weeks after the meeting. The report finally appeared
as a NASA Special Publication, SP 340.
12. Inputs for Electric Propulsion Conference
Data was provided on Saturn and Encke SEP missions using both
Shuttle and Titan launch vehicles. In addition, comparison charts were
prepared for solar electric and ballistic flight modes to Encke. The
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data was presented by NASA at the Electric Propulsion Conference.
13. Saturn Orbiter Performance Curves
Earth-escape and useful orbited payload variations with flight time
to Saturn were generated for the 1985 launch opportunity. The launch
vehicle assumed was the Shuttle/Centaur/SPM. The SPM stage is the
space propulsion module. Periapse radii of 1.6 R s and 3 Rs were
considered. Space storable retro propulsion was assumed.
14. OOS Tug Evaluation
An assessment of OOS (Orbit to Orbit) Tug options (as presented
by MSFC) was performed for the Planetary Programs Division. Tran-
sition period missions were spotted with performance curves for the
Growth Transtage, Growth Agena, and Growth Centaur OOS Stages.
Both expendable and resuable modes were considered. For planetary
missions it was concluded that the Growth Centaur was the most cost-
effective OOS candidate. It also is the only OOS Tug option capable of
meeting post-1984 planetary mission requirements.
15. Ballistic Encke/81 Rendezvous
Preliminary analysis of the use of gravity assist to reduce energy
requirements of a ballistic multi-impulse Encke/81 rendezvous mission
failed to turn up any positive results. Neither Jupiter nor Mars are
properly situated for a useful swingby. It is doubtful that Venus would
be of any interest due to its orbital motion relative to the transfer
trajectory.
16. Comet Encke 80 Flyby /Asteroid Rendezvous Mission
A multi-target mission mode was developed which utilizes SEP
to rendezvous with an asteroid after the encounter with Encke. This
mode could be defined as a "no-risk" Encke flyby mission relative to
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SEP technology. Launched in mid-1980, the earth-Encke transfer is
all-ballistic, and SEP operation begins after comet encounter and is
relied upon only to accomplish the secondary target objectives. The
study was an exploratory analysis and was therefore limited in scope
to a description of trajectory profile and spacecraft mass characteristics.
The pertinent conclusions from this analysis were: 1) an
attractive multi-target mission alternative exists for Encke 1980
exploration; 2) SEP technology would be employed, at virtually no risk
to cometary objectives, to rendezvous with an asteroid after Encke en-
counter; 3) of the two asteroid target studies, Eros offers the better
mission profile; 4) this mission could be the maiden SEP voyage re-
placing the proposed SEP slow flyby if its earlier launch date should
prove to be programmatically impossible; 5) in any event, many future
opportunities should exist for comet flyby-asteroid rendezvous missions
(e. g. Halley 1986) which are uniquely suited to SEP capabilities. Other
multi-target asteroid flyby concepts have been proposed elsewhere but
rendezvous is much preferred for bodies of such small dimensions.
Finally, it appears that the proposed mission concept warrants further
detailed analysis to verify its design and cost feasibility.
17. Pioneer Mars 1979 Mission Options
As part of its continual planning effort, the Planetary Programs
Office has been developing a number of mission options for post-Viking/
75 Mars exploration. For the two remaining Mars launch opportunities
in this decade, i. e. 1977 and 1979, planning emphasis to date has been
placed on derivatives of Viking/75 hardware. NASA's recent commit-
ments to the development of the Space Shuttle in this same time frame
could, however,' reduce resources to a point where a follow-on Viking
mission might not be possible until the early 1980's. If this were to
happen, rather than completely abandoning the Mars opportunity in 1979,
several lower cost mission concepts have been considered .
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The purpose of this study was to conduct a preliminary investigation
of lower cost (<$100M) Mars missions which perform useful explora-
tion objectives after the Viking/75 mission. As a study guideline, it
was assumed that significant cost savings would be realized by utili-
zing Pioneer hardware currently being developed for a pair of 1978
Venus missions. This in turn led to the additional constraint of a 1979
launch with the Atlas/Centaur launch vehicle which has been designated
.for the Pioneer Venus missions.
Selection of science-effective Pioneer mission concepts which
would follow the Viking/75 mission without competing with future
Viking missions in the early 1980's was accomplished by a process of
elimination. Flyby concepts, e. g. a probe/relay bus, a remote
sensor platform, or an atmospheric aeronomy platform, were all re-
jected because of the inadequate sampling time available considering
the advanced state of Mars exploration. Low cost atmospheric entry
probes and rough landers were rejected because their science potential
is largely redundant to Viking/75 objectives. Two concepts, using an
orbiter bus platform, were identified which have both good science
potential and mission simplicity indicative of lower cost. These are:
a) an aeronomy/geology orbiter, and b) a remote sensing orbiter with
a number of deployable surface penetrometers.
Mission A, the Aeronomy/Geology Orbiter, would perform in
situ aeronomy measurements in the Martian ionosphere by using low
periapse altitude (;100km) elliptical orbits. The low altitudes in the
region of periapse also permit the inclusion of several remote sensing
instruments capable of performing geologic surface mapping, e. g. a
radar altimeter and a y-ray spectrometer. Key mission parameters
developed in this study are summarized in the Summary Table. Both
the aeronomy and geology measurements would extend similar Viking
entry/lander science data to a global scale. The trade-off for this
capability is sterilization of the entire Pioneer orbiter spacecraft in
order to meet Mars planetary quarantine requirements. Because the
spacecraft passes through the upper atmosphere every orbit, its
lifetime, even with periapse control, is only several years at best.
The cost of this mission, excluding science, is estimated to be about
$31M (FY '74 dollars). This assumes the modification of an additional
36
Pioneer Venus orbiter flight article, including sterilization, for a
single launch in 1979. Suitable aeronomy instruments are readily
available from many earth satellite programs, some of which have
already been proposed for the Pioneer Venus orbiter mission in 1978.
Appropriate remote sensing geology instruments are much more
questionable, especially the y- ray spectrometer, and could require
significant development. Still, a total mission cost of $40-50M dollars
seems reasonable.
Mission B, the Remote Sensing/Penetrometer Orbiter would
sequentially deploy a number of surface penetrometers to preselected
impact sites distributed in either the northern or southern hemisphere
of the planet. In addition to being a communications relay station be-
tween a deployed penetrometer and the earth, the orbiting bus could
carry a complement of remote sensing instruments for orbital investi-
-gation of the Martian atmosphere and surface. Key mission parameters
developed in this study are given in the Summary Table. A total of
four sterilized penetrometers would be carried by a modified Pioneer
Venus orbiter bus. These would be deployed one at a time from an
elliptical polar orbit over a period of time as long as one Mars year.
Each penetrometer would have its own deorbit motor and entry/
descent system. Penetrometer design and descent velocity specification
provide for a minimum penetration of 1 m in rock without destruction.
During a 1-week surface lifetime each penetrometer would identify soil
penetrability, search for subsurface water, and perform an elemental
chemical analysis of the subsurface material at its impact site. The
data collected from its instruments would be transmitted to the orbiter
once each Mars day for relay back to earth. Between the four one-
week penetrometer missions the orbiter could perform remote sensing
measurements with its own science package. The factors of low cost,
low power, low data rate, and high minimum altitudes (>1000km)
probably restrict these measurements to atmospheric studies with
existing or slightly modified instruments. The scientific merit of
such experiments in 1980 requires further study. The cost of this
mission, excluding orbiter science, for a single 1979 launch is esti-
mated to be about $63M. This figure includes $24M for the development
and fabrication of four penetrometers (including penetrometer science),
one flight spare and a PTM. Depending on the selected orbiter remote
sensing experiments, total cost (excluding launch vehicle) for the
Remote Sensing/Penetrometer Mission could have a range of $70-80M
(FY '74 dollars).
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Summary Table
SELECTED PIONEER MARS MISSION CONCEPTS
Mission A: Aeronomy/Geology Orbiter
o 50-70 kg science payload
o Aeronomy and surface geology science instrumentation
o 300-350 kg orbited payload
o > 100 km periapse altitude
o 24 hour initial orbit period
o 450 orbit inclination
o %One Mars year orbit lifetime
o Entire spacecraft sterilized
Mission B: Remote Sensing Orbiter/Penetrometers
o 40-60 kg orbiter science payload
o Four impact penetrometers @ 40 kg each
o Penetrability, water detection, and soil chemistry
impact science instrumentation
o 500-550 kg orbited payload
o 1000 km periapse altitude
o 24.6 hour controlled orbit
o 900 orbit inclination
o >42 year orbit lifetime
o %One week penetrometer lifetime
o Penetrometers sterilized
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This exploratory analysis has identified and outlined at least two
1979 Mars mission concepts, based on Pioneer Venus technology and
hardware, which have the potential for performing relevant post-
Viking/75 science at a cost of less than $100M. Mission A, the
Aeronomy/Geology Orbiter, represents a minimum development/cost
mission estimated at less than $50M. Yet the broad sampling of iono-
spheric composition and heat balance performed by this mission would
greatly expand the data base from which scientists are trying to under-
stand the evolution of the Martian atmosphere. Further, its potential
for performing global geologic mapping from low altitude, gained by
sterilizing the entire spacecraft, is not possible with the present
Viking orbiter design.
Mission B, the Remote Sensing/Penetrometer Mission, is a
somewhat more expensive mission, with in situ surface objectives,
estimated at a cost of $70-80M. This mission requires the develop-
ment of high impact (% 150m/sec) penetrometers for which there exists
an impressive history of earth-based experience. Pioneer Venus
orbiter modifications would also be more significant than for Mission A.
The science highlights of this mission are a) global exploration for sub-
surface water and b) establishment of a basis for extension of Viking
Lander geologic data to global interpretations. The orbiter has the
capability to perform continued non-imaging remote sensing studies
of Mars from a polar orbit. The penetrometer concept also is a viable
candidate for additional missions after 1979. Besides deploying the
same penetrometers to more sites, there is the potential for a pene-
trometer/seismometer experiment pending development of a longer life
(;90 day) power source.
It is important to point out that neither of these concepts should be
considered feasible on the basis of this study. Many engineering ques-
tions exist for both concepts which require further study. Indeed, the
actual Pioneer Venus Orbiter spacecraft design was not known at the
time this analysis was performed. Undoubtedly there are solutions for
each engineering problem which can be developed in a spacecraft
systems study. The important question to be answered is: "How do
these solutions change the definition and cost of the missions ?"
It is equally important to note that the potential role of Pioneer-
class Mars missions has not been thoroughly explored by a NASA
science advisory group. 1 This potential should be refined for various
post-Viking/75 Mars exploration scenarios as more and better defini-
tions of Pioneer Mars mission concepts are developed.
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